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Disputes between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) and
taxpayers arise when a taxpayer fails to agree with an IRS finding,' refuses to
file a tax return, or refuses to comply with an IRS request for information. 2
The stated mission of the IRS is to "[p]rovide America's taxpayers top
quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities
and by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all."'3 This
emphasis on service is seen not only in taxpayer understanding of the law,
but also in the Service's dispute resolution process. The IRS aims at
resolving taxpayer disputes at the earliest possible point in the resolution
process.4 In pursuit of this goal, the IRS has an Appeals Office (Appeals),
which has a longstanding record of settling taxpayer disputes outside of a
courtroom. 5 In recent years, the IRS has developed other, more formal and
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1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 5,
YOUR APPEAL RIGHTS AND How TO PREPARE A PROTEST IF You DON'T AGREE (1999)
[hereinafter PUBLICATION 5], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
2 Tonya M. Scherer, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Tax Arena: The
Internal Revenue Service Opens Its Doors to Mediation, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 215, 216.
3 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 1,
YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER (2000) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 1], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl .pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
4 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION
2183, IRS CUSTOMER SERVICE STANDARDS ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1997 (1998) (noting
that "Our goal is to satisfactorily resolve all your issues the first time you contact us.");
see also John M. Beehler, IRS Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives, THE TAX
ADVISOR, Feb. 2000, at 116; Internal Revenue Manual § 8.1.3.2, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
5 The Appeals Office handles over 55,000 cases each year and settles taxpayer
disputes before trial in 85% of those cases. See Appeals At-a-Glance, at
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=96750,00.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003); see also
Resolution of Federal Income Tax Controversies: New Tools and a New Attitude for a
New Economy, TAXES, Mar. 2001, at 267, 275 [hereinafter Resolution of Federal Income
Tax Controversies] (reporting that Appeals handles approximately 58,000 cases, 90% of
which are resolved through its settlement procedures).
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narrowly focused, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs designed to
add to the efficient resolution of disputes. 6 These programs include forms of
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration and are aimed at both dispute
prevention and resolution. 7 Additionally, mediation and arbitration are
available even after a case reaches the United States Tax Court.8 This Note
will focus specifically on the presence of negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration in the tax dispute resolution process, with particular attention to
the use of those ADR mechanisms in Appeals.9
Despite the fact that the use of ADR for resolving tax disputes has shown
great promise, both in Appeals and in more narrowly focused programs,
room for growth and improvement remains. The focus in Appeals on
taxpayer-Appeals officer negotiations deserves a critical look, particularly in
6 Scherer, supra note 2, at 217.
The use of ADR provides economic benefits for the IRS, taxpayers, and the court
system. Less formal procedures may make it possible for taxpayers to avoid the cost of
legal representation, and the IRS conserves resources with the expeditious resolution of
cases outside of a courtroom. See Amy S. Wei, Can Mediation Be the Answer to
Taxpayers' Woes?: An Examination of the Internal Revenue Service's Mediation
Program, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 549, 551 (2000). Moreover, resolution of fact-
laden cases prior to litigation lessens pressure on the courts. See David P. Korteling,
Comment, Let Me Tell You How It Will Be; Here's One For You, Nineteen For Me:
Modifying the Internal Revenue Service's Approach to Resolving Tax Disputes, 7 ADMIN
L.J. AM. U. 659, 663, 682-83 (1994). Finally, even when mediation is unsuccessful, the
process can provide benefits. See Charles L. Measter & Peter Skoufalos, The Increasing
Role of Mediation in Resolving Shipping Disputes, 26 TUL. MAR. L.J. 515, 528 (2002)
(noting that "[e]ven if the cases are not settled by mediation, the process has helped
narrow the issues to be heard at trial").
7 See Beehler, supra note 4, at 116 (noting that programs include issue resolution
before a return is filed and dispute resolution at the Appeals level and after litigation has
begun).
8 See U.S. TAx COURT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Rule 124 (2000)
[hereinafter T.C.R.]. For a description of how a case finds its way to United States Tax
Court, see infra Part H. Taxpayers and the IRS can save time and money when litigation
is avoided, and Tax Courts can benefit from a decrease in the number of cases burdening
their dockets. Formal procedural rules have already established arbitration as a viable
alternative to litigation in Tax Court, and arbitration should continue to be encouraged
there. The absence of formal procedural rules for mediation, however, limits the use of
mediation in Tax Court. This is particularly unfortunate given the fact that tax disputes
are particularly well suited for resolution through mediation. Accordingly, formal
mediation procedures should be developed for Tax Courts. See infra Part lI.B.2.
9 The primary focus of this Note is the use of ADR after a tax dispute has arisen. For
a survey of some of the dispute prevention mechanisms used by the IRS, see generally
Thomas Carter Louthan & Steven C. Wrappe, Building a Better Resolution: Adapting IRS




regard to its effect on taxpayers with either very small or very large claims.
Specifically, the overall fairness of the system for taxpayers with small
claims is questionable, considering the fact that these taxpayers will invest
relatively little time and money in a vigorous defense.10 Few are likely to
invest in legal representation, and many will value early settlement over a
prolonged resolution that would eventually subsume the total value of the
claim. Accordingly, the settlements that are reached may not be totally fair
for small taxpayers. Moreover, negotiation is not particularly conducive to
the settlement of large tax disputes, In cases where tens or hundreds of
thousands of dollars separate the positions of the IRS and the taxpayer,
ardent representation is warranted because even after prolonged litigation,
the taxpayer may come out ahead."I A shift in the structure of Appeals from
a focus on negotiation to mediation may alleviate these specific problems
regarding large and small taxpayers. 12 In mediation, the involvement of an
independent, neutral third party will address the inequities that typically arise
with small claims. 13 Furthermore, an independent neutral is likely to force
taxpayers and Appeals officers to fairly assess the strength and fairness of
their positions, which would ultimately result in the settlement of a greater
number of large claims. 14
This Note will examine the use of negotiation and mediation throughout
the tax dispute resolution process, focusing specifically on the Appeals
process, and suggest how these mechanisms can be more fully utilized by the
IRS. This Note will also briefly discuss the extent to which arbitration is
utilized in tax dispute resolution. Part U will examine the broad structure of
tax dispute resolution. This will include a discussion of the history,
procedure, and success of the Appeals Office and analysis of the more
narrowly focused ADR programs that have emerged in recent years. Part III
will offer a critique of how ADR is utilized in the tax dispute resolution
process. This will include examination of overall mediator impartiality and
10 See infra Part I.A.
11 Id.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 4.13 (2001)
(describing how evaluation of the parties' positions may counter power imbalances and
help lead to fairer settlements). Mediator impartiality is also an important factor that
reduces the impact of a power imbalance between the parties. That is, an impartial
mediator ensures that a settlement is fair to both parties. See id. § 4.15; see also infra Part
IV.
14 See WARE, supra note 13, § 4.13 (explaining the significance of a neutral
mediator's evaluation of each party's claim in the settlement process). Also, a mediator
may act to overcome "barriers to settlement" so that the parties will both move toward a
mutually acceptable "settlement zone." Id. § 4.11; see also infra Part IV.
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the adequacy of the application of ADR in Appeals. Part IV will suggest a
broader employment of mediation by the IRS.
11. TAX DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRUCTURE
Prior to examining the methods of resolving disputes, a cursory view of
the conflict process is helpful. Conflicts generally begin through the audit
process. 15 If an audit is not followed by an agreement between the taxpayer
and the IRS agent concerning the amount of tax owed, 16 the taxpayer may
file a protest letter with Appeals 17 or pursue his claim legally (i.e., in
court). 18 If the taxpayer chooses not to submit his case to Appeals, or if
15 A taxpayer may be audited because his return has been red-flagged by the IRS
because of a possible problem or inaccuracy, or the audit may be a result of random
selection. See PUBLICATION 1, supra note 3; see also Korteling, supra note 6, at 662-63.
See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
PUBLICATION 3498, THE EXAMINATION PROCESS (2003) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 3498],
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3498.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003)
(outlining the audit examination process). Relatively few tax returns are audited each
year. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that in 2000, 0.49% of all tax
returns filed by individuals were audited. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
IRS AUDIT RATES (2001), available at http:llfrwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d01484.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). This audit
rate is down 70% from 1996, when 1.67% of individual tax returns were audited. Id.
16 The taxpayer's initial communication with the IRS regarding a disputed finding
consists of a meeting with the supervisor of the person who made the finding.
PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1. This meeting may result in an agreement and can take
place either in person or over the telephone. Id. Realistically, the taxpayer has little
opportunity to engage in substantive negotiations with the IRS agent while the case is still
in the audit process. See Keith Gercken et al., Dancing to the Right Tune: A Comparative
Discussion of Negotiations with Revenue Authorities, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L 1367, 1367
(1998). This is because the IRS agent is not permitted to consider the hazards of litigation
and the strength of the Service's position at this point. Id. Because the IRS agent must
rigidly adhere to the IRS finding, very little negotiation actually takes place at this stage
in the administrative process. Id. See generally PUBLICATION 3498, supra note 15
(outlining procedure at the audit stage of the dispute).
17 For a summary of the Appeals process, see infra Part II.A.
18 The IRS encourages taxpayers to pursue resolution through its Appeals Office,
but taxpayers have the right to pursue their claims directly in court. See PUBLICATION 5,
supra note 1. If the dispute involves a question of whether a particular amount of tax is
owed, the taxpayer would pursue his claim in United States Tax Court. Id. If a taxpayer
seeks a refund of money already paid, he would pursue his claim in either United States




resolution is unsuccessful after the Appeals process has run its course, he
may sue the IRS. 19
A. The Appeals Office: Negotiation
With the establishment of the Appeals Office in 1927, 20 the IRS first
embraced the value of resolving taxpayer disputes without litigation.2 1 The
Appeals Office operates independently from the local IRS office with which
the taxpayer has interacted; however, a case that goes to Appeals remains
under the jurisdiction of the IRS. 22 An appeal to the Appeals Office
represents an administrative option to contest a claim of the IRS, and it is
designed to be an impartial forum 23 in which a taxpayer can try to settle the
dispute. 24
A taxpayer can initiate the Appeals process by filing a protest letter.25 An
Appeals officer then considers the merits of the case and the time and cost of
19 See Korteling, supra note 6, at 668-69. By directing a claim to Appeals, a
taxpayer does not lose his right to pursue the claim in court. Id.
20 See Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1473.
21 See Korteling, supra note 6, at 668-69 (noting that at the administrative appeals
stage "the IRS has substantial ADR efforts"). Further evidence of the Service's mission
to resolve disputes prior to litigation is the "exhaustion rule," which limits an award of
attorney's fees to only those cases in which all available administrative remedies have
been exhausted. See William E. Taggart, Corporation Argues Payment for Consulting
Services Is Deductible, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 18, 2002), LEXIS 2002 TNT 117-37;
26 U.S.C. § 7430 (b)(1) (2000). The exhaustion rule is designed to "encourage taxpayers
and the IRS to administratively resolve tax disputes and to discourage the resolution of
such disputes through litigation." Taggart, supra.
22 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION
556, EXAMINATION OF RETURNS, APPEAL RIGHTS, AND CLAIMS FOR REFUND (1999)
[hereinafter PUBLICATION 556], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p556.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003). Once a case is pursued in court, on the other hand, it is under the
jurisdiction of that court. Id.
23 The IRS emphasizes the fairness of the Appeals Division by describing it as an
office "separate from-and independent of-the IRS Office taking the action [the
taxpayer] disagree[s] with." PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1.
24 If a case fails to come to resolution while under the jurisdiction of the Appeals
Division, settlement is still possible, even after litigation has commenced. The
Department of Justice Tax Division, which handles tax cases in Federal District Court,
also has developed a policy regarding the settlement of tax disputes. See United States
Department of Justice Tax Division, Alternative Dispute Resolution Case Selection
Criteria, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/jcmanhtn/exh40.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
25 Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1473. A taxpayer is required to submit an
extensive protest letter in almost all cases. Among the items a protest letter must include
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litigation to arrive at a settlement figure.26 An Appeals conference is then
scheduled so that the Appeals officer and the taxpayer can attempt to
negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. 27
The Appeals process is designed to be neutral and has the purpose of
effecting decisions regarding the settlement of taxpayer disputes.28 After
reviewing the facts and evidence, and upon considering the hazards of
litigation, the Appeals officer determines a fair position for the IRS. 29 The
IRS model is designed so that the Appeals officer enters the settlement
negotiations with a "quasi-judicial" 30 attitude embodying an "open mind and
[with] genuine interest in working out a mutually acceptable agreement. '31
The primary focus of the Appeals process is negotiation. 32 That is, the
taxpayer and Appeals officer try to settle the dispute "through persuasion
regarding the merits of their respective positions. '33 The taxpayer has the
are a formal request for Appeals consideration, a statement of the facts surrounding the
claim at issue, a summary of the legal arguments on which the taxpayer relies, and a
statement attesting to the truth of the contents of the letter accompanied by the taxpayer's
signature. See PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1. Claims under $25,000 are considered "small
case requests" and do not require a full protest letter. Id. A "small case request" consists
of a letter that requests Appeals consideration, indicates areas of disagreements, and
explains the reasons for the disagreement. Id.
26 Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1474.
27 PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1. The Appeals conference is designed to minimize
tension and maximize convenience for the taxpayer. "Conferences with Appeals Office
personnel are held in an informal manner by correspondence, by telephone or at a
personal conference." Id.
28 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 215. The Appeals officer is neutral in the sense that
he does not act purely "as an advocate of the IRS position developed by IRS
Examination." Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1474.
29 See Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1474. "Hazards of litigation" refers to
the cost-benefit analysis regarding the probability of success through litigation. See
Korteling, supra note 6, at 667-68 n.44. Prior to the Appeals stage, an IRS auditor may
not consider the hazards of litigation while trying to negotiate an agreement with the
taxpayer. See Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1474.
30 Internal Revenue Manual § 8.6.1.2.3, available at http://www.irs.gov/
irm/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
31 id.
32 For a general overview of negotiation practice and principles, see WARE, supra
note 13, § 3.
33 Alan H. Friedman, Should the State Tax Community Use Alternative Dispute
Resolution Processes? Or, Should We Just Keep on Throwing Stones?, 22 STATE TAX
NoTEs 765, 766 (2001) (describing the appeals process in state tax agencies, which have
appeals procedures analogous to the Appeals Office of the IRS).
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right to have representation at an Appeals conference, but, according to the
IRS, representation is not necessary. 34
The use of negotiation by Appeals represents a system designed to cover
a broad range of disputes 35 and has shown great success statistically. In fact,
between eighty-five and ninety percent of the cases that reach Appeals result
in settlement. 36 However, in 1996, Congress mandated that all government
agencies begin to implement ADR into their administrative dispute resolution
processes. 37 Additionally, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 has
led the IRS to develop more formal ADR policies and procedures. 38 This
congressional action, along with a desire for greater efficiency, has brought
about the development of mediation and arbitration programs designed to
supplement the existing Appeals process. 39
34 See PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1.
35 Id. (noting that taxpayers "may appeal most IRS decisions with [their] local
Appeals Office.").
36 See supra note 5.
37 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-84 (1998)
[hereinafter ADRA]; see also Scherer, supra note 2, at 215 (noting how the ADRA "has
enhanced the recent trend toward the implementation of ADR procedures"); see also
Wei, supra note 6, at 552 (noting that the purpose of the ADRA is "to encourage federal
agencies to 'reap the benefits of ADR processes"') (citing Robin J. Evans, Note, The
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996: Improving Federal Agency Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 217, 233 (1998)).
The ADRA has led many federal agencies to establish dispute resolution programs.
By 2000, more than twenty-nine federal agencies had at least begun to develop such
programs. See Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The
Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1019 n.9 (2001); see also
MARSHALL J. BREGER, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 and the
Private Practitioner, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 1,
10-11 (2001). For a discussion of how other federal agencies have implemented ADR
procedures, see Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal Government:
Not Such Strange Bedfellows After All, 66 Mo. L. REV. 709, 719-22 (2001) (discussing
the use of mediation by the United States Postal Service, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency); Michael Z. Green,
Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge
Processing By Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 332 (2001) (discussing
how the mediation program used by the EEOC has helped reduce its backlog of cases);
Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation As a Means of Developing and
Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 143 (1999) (discussing the development of negotiated rulemaking
with OSHA and EPA).
38 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
39 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 217 (noting that the new programs started by the IRS
"target specific types of disputes so as to insure that the new procedures do not
undermine the Appeals process").
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B. Fonnal ADR Initiatives: Mediation and Arbitration40
As a result of congressional mandate 41 and as part of its efforts to make
substantial gains in improving its image and service, 42 the IRS has developed
formal dispute resolution mechanisms for tax cases.43 With the historically
high settlement rate experienced by Appeals, the IRS initially designed its
more formal ADR programs to supplement, rather than replace, the existing
system.44 That is, new initiatives tend to have a more narrow focus, as
compared to Appeals. 45
1. Mediation
Mediation is available throughout the dispute resolution process: first
while the case is under the jurisdiction of the IRS, and second when the case
is in the Tax Court's jurisdiction.46 The IRS has made significant efforts to
expand the availability of mediation as another tool to effect agreement.47
40 The IRS offers many dispute resolution programs other than Appeals negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration that are beyond the scope of this Note. For a good summary of
other IRS ADR programs available before and after the taxpayer files his return, see
generally Beehler, supra note 4, at 116.
41 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (1998)
(requiring federal agencies to develop ADR programs); IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (enacting § 7123 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which makes arbitration and non-binding mediation available to taxpayers); see
also Wei, supra note 6, at 552-53; Scherer, supra note 2, at 215.
42 See Wei, supra note 6, at 554 (explaining how the IRS is working to "becom[e] a
customer-oriented agency"); see also Larry R. Langdon, Resolving Actual and Potential
Disputes with the IRS in the New Economy, TAXES, Mar. 2001, at 261, 262 [hereinafter
Resolving Actual and Potential Disputes] (noting that emphasis on issue resolution rather
than litigation has discouraged the raising of "issues that don't have legal substance").
43 The Service's advance pricing agreement (APA) program, begun in 1991, marked
an early experimentation with ADR. See Beehler, supra note 4, at 116. That program
focused on resolving international intercompany price issues prior to the actual filing of a
return. Id. By 1995, the IRS had established a one-year test period for the limited use of
mediation. See Scherer, supra note 2, at 219. Additionally, in 1990, the Tax Court
adopted Rule 124, which made available voluntary arbitration. Id. at 218 n.27.
44 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 215 (noting that non-Appeals resolution programs
are directed at specific types of tax disputes).
45 See Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1474; Wei, supra note 6, at 552. For
example, mediation is typically available only after the traditional Appeals process has
failed to render a settlement. Id.
46 See 26 U.S.C. § 7123 (2000); T.C.R. 124 (2000); see also infra note 48.
47 See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10 § 2 (establishing the procedure for
mediation within Appeals); Ken C. Jones, An Expanded Appeals Mediation Program
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Mediation has seen less success in Tax Court, however, due in large part to
the fact that formal procedures have yet to be developed. 48
Mediation can be thought of as "negotiation plus." 49 That is, it takes the
principles of negotiation (i.e., evaluation and persuasion) 50 and adds a third
party to facilitate an agreement. 51 The mediator is essentially a third party
through whom the parties can engage in negotiation. 52 The success of
mediation, then, depends on the presence of open communication 53 and
with a Restriction, TAX NOTEs TODAY (Sept. 25, 2002), LEXIS 2002 TNT 186-30
(describing the broad availability of mediation); see also Wei, supra note 6, at 549 (citing
time and money savings as an important factor in the development of mediation by the
IRS).
48 See Erin M. Collins, Mediation Should Be Available to All Taxpayers, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Aug. 8, 2002), LEXIS 2002 TNT 153-77. Cases that have not successfully
reached settlement and which enter litigation may still be settled by mediation in Tax
Court or another federal court. See id.; see also Korteling, supra note 6, at 668-69
(discussing the various federal court forum alternatives available for taxpayers).
Mediation is not mandatory in Tax Court, but Tax Court judges have allowed parties to
pursue mediation under the authority of Rule 124 or under their general discretion. When
mediation has been pursued in Tax Court, the parties have worked together to come up
with ad hoc guidelines. See Collins, supra. Tax Court Rule 124 focuses on the
availability of and procedure for voluntary binding arbitration, and although the rule does
not provide similar guidelines for mediation, mediation is still available in Tax Court.
Section (b)(5) of Rule 124 explicitly states that "[n]othing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to exclude use by the parties of other forms of voluntary disposition of cases,
including mediation." T.C.R. 124. Mediation is also available if the case is in United
States District Court. Specifically, the court can order the parties to engage in non-
binding mediation. For an example of rules and procedure associated with mediation in
United States District Court, see Lee v. Commissioner, No. C-00-285, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16324 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2000). Despite the absence of formal guidelines,
mediation while under the jurisdiction of a federal court typically looks similar to
mediation in Appeals. That is, mediation is generally entered into voluntarily by the
parties, is non-binding, and involves a neutral third party mediator. In Tax Court
mediation, either the Tax Court judge or a Special Trial Judge acts as mediator and in Lee
v. Commissioner the mediator could not have "any financial or personal interest in the
result of the mediation." Lee, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16324, at *3.
49 WARE, supra note 13, § 4.2.
50 See supra text accompanying note 29.
51 See WARE, supra note 13, § 4.2.
52 See id. Ultimately, mediation "places the parties in control of resolving their case,
and provides the opportunity to argue the merits of the case before a fresh face, with a
qualified mediator adding a whole new dimension to the negotiation process." Sharon
Katz-Pearlman & Jonathan S. Adelson, IRS Restructuring and Transfer Pricing
Enforcement, 20 TAx NOTES INT'L 2617, 2626 (2000).
53 See Alexei P. Mostovoi, Tax Mediation: Is It Just a Test?, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L.
1871, 1875 (1996). When the parties are "forthcoming... in releasing information...
the mediator and the parties are likely to be more creative in identifying solutions
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trust 54 among the participants. More open communication can be
accomplished when the confidentiality of the mediation session is
guaranteed. 55 For example, when parties are confident that the information
they disclose cannot be used against them in a subsequent legal action, they
will be more likely to engage in full disclosure. 56 Likewise, a greater degree
of trust results when the parties are confident that the mediator is impartial.
The importance of mediator impartiality centers on the fact that one of the
mediator's roles is to evaluate the merits of the claims of each party and to
engage the parties in discussion and compromise. 57 Ultimately, parties will
be less willing to fully disclose information and wholly accept the mediator's
evaluation of their claim if they have the impression that the mediator is
partial to the other side. Therefore, with the preservation of confidentiality
and impartiality, information can be freely shared among the mediation
participants, which, in turn, will allow the mediator to gain an accurate
understanding of the claims. 58
Several factors characterize the mediation of tax disputes. Primarily,
mediation is typified by "informality" and "flexibility" and is
"voluntary ... and nonbinding [in] nature." 59 The ability to mold the process
to the needs of the parties 60 and the use of informal rules of evidence 61 make
[because] they have sufficient understanding of the interests and objectives of each
participant in the process." Id.
54 See id. at 1878 (noting that a mediator's conflict of interest may affect the trust
among the parties and "taint the substantive outcome" of mediation); see also WARE,
supra note 13, § 4.2 (noting the importance of the fact that a mediator is the "agent" of
neither party).
55 See Mostovoi, supra note 53, at 1875-76.
56 See id. (noting that "the availability and extent of legal protection from
subsequent disclosure" is directly related to the "willingness of the parties to provide and
exchange information").
57 See WARE, supra note 13, § 4.13. The evaluation of the merits of each party's
claim is important in recognizing a "settlement zone" in which the parties may come to
an agreement. Id. Evaluation is vital because it may be the necessary step for a party to
realize that it has over-estimated the strength of its claim. Id.
58 See Mostovoi, supra note 53, at 1875. Full understanding of the claims will help
the mediator act as a facilitator by allowing her to intelligently define the issues. See Rev.
Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10 § 2 (2002).
59 Wei, supra note 6, at 555.
60 Id.
61 David F. Rock, A First-Hand Look at Mediation with the Service: How to Make
the Most of It, 93 J. TAx'N 69, 72 (2000).
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mediation particularly attractive. 62 Furthermore, because it is nonbinding, the
taxpayer has little to lose-in the event that an acceptable settlement is not
reached, litigation can still be pursued.63 Second, mediation forces both
parties to seriously examine their claims as they prepare for the mediation
session 64 and ensures that a neutral third party will examine the merits of
each side's claims anew, providing an untainted perspective in the dispute.65
Ultimately, the availability of mediation gives the taxpayer and the IRS one
more opportunity to resolve the dispute in a relatively fast and cost-effective
manner.
66
The mentality within the IRS is that the use of mediation can supplement
the success of Appeals.67 In fact, non-binding mediation is generally
available only at the conclusion of the traditional Appeals process. 68 The
62 An additional benefit of mediation is the fact that it is not limited to "predefined
legal remedies," so that the parties can work together, and even compromise, to reach an
acceptable end. See Wei, supra note 6, at 555-56.
63 Collins, supra note 48; see also Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10 § 2.
64 Jones, supra note 47. The parties are actually involved in face-to-face mediation
for one or two days, but the entire mediation process usually takes about 120 days. See
Collins, supra note 48; see also Beehler, supra note 4, at 116.
65 Resolution of Federal Income Tax Controversies, supra note 5, at 276.
66 Collins, supra note 48.
The cost-effectiveness of mediation is emphasized with an examination of a case that
reached settlement through mediation in 1999. See generally Rock, supra note 61, at 69.
The case involved a factual dispute over the value of a piece of real estate, and "[a]fter
lengthy and arduous negotiations, the parties were at an impasse." Id. There was
significant disparity between the respective proposals made by the Appeals officer and
the taxpayer, and normally, litigation would have been the next inevitable step. Id.
However, when mediation was pursued at the suggestion of the taxpayer's attorney,
settlement was ultimately reached in an eight-hour session. Id. The taxpayer's attorney
credited the success of mediation to the informality of the process and the fact that the
presence of a neutral third party forced the parties to reexamine the strength of their
respective proposals. Id. at 72.
67 For example, Larry Langdon, director of the Large and Mid-Size Business
Division stated, "The new tools that we have today, combined with the tools we have
used in the past, provide the means to solve problems." Resolution of Federal Income Tax
Controversies, supra note 5, at 268.
68 See 26 U.S.C. § 7123 (b)(1)(A) (2002); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26
I.R.B. 11 § 4.01 (explaining that mediation "may be used only after Appeals settlement
discussions are unsuccessful"); Wei, supra note 6, at 557 (noting that the use of
mediation is limited to situations where Appeals negotiations have failed).
Mediation is available before the Appeals process even begins, but at that stage a
major limitation is present. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, PUBLICATION 3605, FAST TRACK MEDIATION: A PROCESS FOR PROMPT
RESOLUTION OF TAX ISSUES (2001) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 3605], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3605.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). That is, fast track
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Service's first experiment with mediation came in 1995, with limited scope
and availability. 69 Three years later Congress required the development of
procedures for the availability of mediation in the Appeals process. 70 In
2002, the mediation program became a permanent part of the Appeals
process and even greater expansions in availability were made, with the
removal of many of the eligibility requirements. 71 In fact, effective July 1,
2002, the IRS completely abolished the amount in controversy requirement,
"mak[ing] mediation available to a much wider taxpayer audience than
previously was the case." 72 Additionally, mediation is no longer limited to
the resolution of factual issues. 73 This change makes mediation "available for
mediation is limited because it takes place prior to the case entering the jurisdiction of the
Appeals Office. The case's jurisdictional status is of crucial significance because when a
case is in the examination phase, the IRS agent is not permitted to consider the hazards of
litigation in his settlement figure. See Gercken et al., supra note 16, at 1367; see also
PUBLICATION 3498, supra note 16. This, in turn, will affect the ultimate ability to have
any substantive and productive negotiations. See Part H.A, supra note 17. The IRS
initiated pilot fast track mediation programs for large and mid-size business and small
business and self-employed taxpayers that were designed to further expedite the
availability of mediation. See Sheryl Stratton, LMSB: At Work for Tax Executives, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 20, 2002), LEXIS 2002 TNT 54-3; Internal Revenue Service, IRS
Offers Faster Resolution of Tax Disputes, TAx NOTES TODAY (June 27, 2002), LEXIS
2002 TNT 124-19 [hereinafter Faster Resolution]. These programs allowed qualifying
taxpayers to by-pass the traditional settlement option offered by Appeals and proceed
directly to mediation. See Rock, supra note 61, at 69. The fast track programs are
designed to produce resolution within 120 days. See Stratton, supra. They also focus on
"resolving controversy at the earliest resolution point within the IRS." Faster Resolution,
supra. In fast track mediation, an Appeals officer who is trained in mediation acts as the
mediator. See PUBLICATION 3605, supra. For a critique of fast track mediation see infra
Part IV.
69 See Rock, supra note 61, at 69. This first program was relatively limited, with few
cases meeting the narrow eligibility requirements. Id. At its initiation, mediation was
available only for Coordinated Examination Program (CEP) cases, and was limited to
cases involving over $10 million. Id. at 70 n.1; Jones, supra note 47. However, by 1998
mediation became available (also on a trial basis) to help resolve factual issues in cases
involving $1 million or more. See Rock, supra note 61, at 69.
70 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 7123) (requiring the IRS to make non-
binding mediation available for cases that are unresolved after the negotiation in
Appeals); see also Gerald A. Kafka, Restructuring and Reforming the IRS and the
Code-Congress Takes a Quantum Leap, 89 J. TAX'N 133, 139 (1998) (mentioning
increased availability of ADR as one of the many taxpayer service improvements
required by Congress).
71 See Jones, supra note 47; see also Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10.
72 Jones, supra note 47; see also Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10.
73 Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10.
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any qualifying issues ... that are already in the Appeals administrative
process."' 74 The progressive increase in the popularity of mediation is the
result of success of the various trial programs since 1995, and it demonstrates
an effort by the Service to ensure that even more cases avoid litigation. 75 One
significant limitation remains for the availability of mediation in Appeals. 76
Namely, Appeals mediation is available only after taxpayer-Appeals officer
negotiations have failed. 77
2. Arbitration
Arbitration is also available for the resolution of tax disputes.
Theoretically, arbitration is available both while a case is under the
jurisdiction of the IRS and after it has gone to Tax Court.78 If both
negotiation and mediation have failed in Appeals, the taxpayer may request
arbitration for the issue. 79 However, the use of arbitration has been largely
limited to cases that are in Tax Court. This is due, in large part, to the fact
that the IRS has only recently extended the availability of arbitration in
Appeals. 80
74 Id.
75 See Jones, supra note 47. Evidence of the Service's attitude about the avoidance
of litigation is seen in a statement by the director of its Large and Mid-Size Business
Division: "I don't think mediation is for everyone, but it really looks like a win/win
situation for the taxpayer and Appeals in many cases." Resolution of Federal Income Tax
Controversies, supra note 5, at 276.
76 It is important to distinguish "mediation in Appeals" from Fast Track Mediation,
which takes place prior to the case coming under the jurisdiction of Appeals. See
PUBLICATION 3605, supra note 68.
77 Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. § 4.01 (stating mediation "may be used only
after Appeals settlement discussions are unsuccessful").
78 See T.C.R 124 (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 7123 (b)(2) (2002).
79 See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. § 5.16; see also Announcement 2002-60,
2002-26 I.R.B. 28.
80 See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Announces Extension of Test of Arbitration,
TAX NOTES TODAY (June 10, 2002), LEXIS 2002 TNT 111-17 [hereinafter Extension of
Test ofArbitration]; see also Scherer, supra note 2, at 218 n.27.
Arbitration is available in Tax Court when the taxpayer and IRS agree, through a
joint motion, to submit the case to arbitration. See Korteling, supra note 6, at 669. The
parties can pursue arbitration at any time prior to the beginning of trial. Id. Arbitration
takes place under the supervision of the Tax Court. Id. Along with their motions, the
parties are each required to stipulate the issues to be resolved and agree to be bound by
the decision of the arbitrator. T.C.R. 124 (b)(2) (2000). The arbitrator is then appointed
by the Tax Court. See 35 Am. Jur. 2D Federal Tax Enforcement § 846 (2001). Although
the arbitrator is technically appointed by the Tax Court, the parties do have some input
into arbitrator selection. The Tax Court judge appoints the arbitrator based on whom the
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Arbitration is a more formal dispute resolution process that involves a
third party arbitrator with settlement authority. 81 That is, once the parties
have submitted their case to arbitration, the decision of the arbitrator is
binding. Arbitration provides two primary benefits over litigation-relaxed
rules of evidence and a relaxed adversarial setting. 82 These factors are
particularly advantageous for taxpayers who do not have legal representation
because less legal expertise is required.
Congress, as part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
mandated that the Service develop a pilot program for arbitration in the
Appeals Office. 83 In 2000, Appeals first established its pilot arbitration
program. 84 As of July 2002, binding arbitration is generally available for all
cases in Appeals for which negotiations have failed. 85 The latest extension of
the availability of arbitration has not made it a permanent fixture in Appeals,
however. 86 Ultimately, the characteristics of arbitration limit its availability
and attractiveness 87 and make mediation a more likely preference for many
taxpayers.88
parties have jointly agreed to or based on selection procedure agreed to by the parties. See
T.C.R. 124 (b)(2)(C) (2000). Tax Court Rule 124 details the procedure that leads up to
arbitration. Significantly, arbitration is limited to the resolution of factual issues only;
therefore, unresolved legal issues may not be submitted. Also, arbitration differs
significantly from mediation in that the decision of the arbitration panel is binding. Id.;
see also Korteling, supra note 6, at 670. "To avoid the [due process concerns] that
arise.., when an arbitrator performs a judicial function, the Tax Court must retain
authority to review the final decision. Thus, the Court must 'supervise' the arbitration,
and the parties must agree to be bound by the arbitrators' findings." Id.
81 See JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 138
(2001).
82 See Korteling, supra note 6, at 681.
83 26 U.S.C. § 7123 (b)(2) (2002) (calling for a program that would allow the
taxpayer and Appeals officer to jointly request arbitration for unresolved issues).
84 I.R.S. Announcement 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 317.
85 See Extension of Test of Arbitration, supra note 80. The Appeals Office has a
preference for traditional negotiation. This is evidenced by the fact that neither mediation
nor arbitration are available in Appeals until after taxpayer-Appeals officer negotiations
have failed. See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. § 4.01 (noting that mediation is
available only when traditional Appeals has failed); Extension of Test of Arbitration,
supra note 80 (noting that arbitration is available only when traditional Appeals has
failed).
86 See Extension of Test of Arbitration, supra note 80 (the pilot program ran from
July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003).
87 Mediation is a more attractive option for taxpayers because it is nonbinding and
much more flexible. See Wei, supra note 6, at 555. In mediation, the parties are free to
withdraw at any time. Id. A taxpayer may be less likely to pursue arbitration if mediation
is a viable option, due to the fact that if the mediation process is an unfavorable
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADR IN RESOLVING IRS-
TAXPAYER DISPUTES
Recent history has certainly evidenced movement toward broader use of
ADR in the resolution of tax disputes.89 Both Congress and the IRS have
recognized the potential value ADR is capable of providing for taxpayers and
government alike.90 Traditional negotiation, mediation, and arbitration have
demonstrated how all parties can save time and money via participation in
the Appeals process.91 While the success of existing ADR mechanisms
cannot be doubted, they may be open to even greater improvements in
efficiency and quality. Particularly, the current Appeals structure, which
relies predominantly on taxpayer-Appeals officer negotiation, presents
problems as to very large or very small tax disputes. 92 Ultimately, the IRS
and taxpayers would be well served were Appeals to shift its focus from a
negotiation-based system to one that relies predominantly upon mediation.
93
With that in mind, this section will take a closer look at the strengths and
weaknesses of each form of ADR currently used throughout the tax dispute
resolution process.
A. The Appeals Office-A Good Foundation
The longevity of, and the Service's commitment to, the Appeals process
rests largely on the fact that it has successfully produced resolution in most
cases.94 Appeals allows taxpayers to pursue settlement in a personal
conference with the IRS and represents an advantageous alternative to
litigation in many cases.95 However, in spite of its impressive eighty-five to
experience the taxpayer may still have his day in court. Id.; see also Robert A. Zarzar &
James A. Dougherty, AICPA Officials Testify on IRS Performance, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Jan. 28, 2003), LEXIS 2003 TNT 18-25 (noting that a strength of mediation is the fact
that the mediator merely acts as a "facilitator for communication," having no authority to
bind the parties).
88 See infra discussion Part mI.C.
89 See supra Part H.
90 See generally Scherer, supra note 2, at 215 (noting that the enactment of the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act was a response to dissatisfaction with the high
costs of litigation).
91 See id. (noting how Appeals settlement and other ADR procedures have the
"primary intent of producing more efficient resolutions").
92 See infra Part III.A.
93 See infra Part IV.
94 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 215.
95 See id.
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ninety percent settlement rate, 96 Appeals is not the best alternative when two
distinct groups of taxpayers are involved: first, those with relatively few
resources pursuing relatively small claims, and second, those with a great
deal of resources pursuing relatively large claims.
Appeals does not necessarily provide complete fairness for taxpayers
defending small claims. As a matter of economics, a small claim will not
justify hiring professional counsel. 97 If the amount in controversy is not
above a certain level, a taxpayer will probably choose not to pay for
representation. Taxpayers may be disadvantaged, however, if they elect not
to acquire professional representation. 98 According to the IRS, "[tihere is no
need for [the taxpayer] to have representation at an Appeals conference." 99
However, those taxpayers that forego representation will sit across the table
from Appeals officers, who-no matter how impartial and judicious-
96 See supra note 36. In 2000, Appeals had an inventory of about 58,000 cases. Id.
97 In fact, "[1]egal representation is not available to most Americans who have legal
problems." Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 33, 35 (2000). The
economic reality facing potential litigants with relatively small claims is illustrated in
shareholder class actions. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM L. REV. 669, 678 (1986) (discussing the fact that
individual clients have only a nominal stake in shareholder derivative actions). In those
cases, an individual claim for a few hundred, or even a few thousand, dollars will not
justify the expense that is incurred in hiring legal representation and pursuing litigation.
Id. Taxpayers with relatively small amounts of money in dispute with the IRS are
comparable to class action litigants, in that the individual claim is not large enough to
warrant hiring legal representation.
Furthermore, the IRS will not necessarily make a similar economic calculation
regarding small claims. That is, the IRS may vigorously pursue a claim merely for its
potential precedential value. See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. § 3.07; Marcus &
Senger, supra note 37, at 712 (noting that "[i]n tax litigation, a private party may be
willing to compromise a monetary claim, whereas the government may be reluctant to do
so-even on a reasonable basis from a risk-assessment standpoint-because of the need
to establish a precedent for other cases.").
98 See PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1. According to the IRS, a taxpayer may represent
himself at an appeals conference or "may have an attorney, certified public accountant, or
an individual enrolled to practice before the IRS represent" him. Id. Although a taxpayer
can be represented by a certified public accountant [CPA] in Appeals, a CPA cannot
represent a taxpayer in Tax Court unless he passes an examination. See Matthew A.
Melone, Income Tax Practice and Certified Public Accountants: The Case for a Status
Based Exemption From State Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 11 AKRON TAX J. 47,
54 n.31 (1995). Many of the inequities that arise from a taxpayer's lack of representation
are mitigated when the taxpayer and IRS engage in mediation rather than negotiation. See
infra Part I.B.
99 PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1.
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possess a degree of expertise as IRS employees. 100 This discrepancy may
place taxpayers at a distinct disadvantage in some cases. Indeed, tax law
will at times involve difficult questions of interpretation of statute or court
decision, and the validity of regulations or statute; they will also involve
doubtful questions of nontax law on which tax issues may depend .... Such
questions, in general, are the kind for which lawyers are equipped by
training and practice. 10 1
Based on this disparity in expertise between an average taxpayer and an IRS
Appeals officer, the current structure of Appeals presents the possibility that
small tax disputes will be resolved inequitably, casting significant doubt on
the ultimate efficacy of Appeals's seemingly impressive settlement rate.
An additional deficiency for small claimants in the Appeals system lies
in the fact that the fear of "the burdens of litigation, primarily time and
expense, often overwhelm the taxpayer,"' 0 2 and may lead to a possibly
inequitable settlement. Especially for relatively small claims, it may make
little economic sense for a taxpayer to invest much time and money in a
vigorous attempt to win a dispute, 10 3 causing the taxpayer to cut his losses
and accept the existing IRS offer. Yet, even in the case of relatively small
claims, this mentality may deprive taxpayers of plenary justice-a result that
runs in the face of the Service's mission.10 n Ultimately, a taxpayer with
limited financial resources may not be able to fully realize the strength of his
claim, and that fact may lead to hastened and unfair settlement. By
100 See Korteling, supra note 6, at 673 & 680. "While the procedure [in Appeals] is
not as formal as that in a court, the taxpayers facing technical or complex issues are at a
significant disadvantage in preparing and presenting evidence to support their claim." Id.
at 680.
101 Melone, supra note 98, at 67 (quoting Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 797
(Minn. 1951)). Furthermore, tax law tends to be a very specialized and complex area of
law. See id. at 82, 102.
102 Lee G. Knight & Ray A. Knight, Dispute Resolution with the IRS and Taxpayer
Bill of Rights 2, 13 AKRON TAX J. 27, 68 (1997). The cost of a vigorous defense of a tax
dispute may lead to settlement, even though research of the issue would have revealed a
high probability of success in court. Id.
103 See Korteling, supra note 6, at 663 ("Expensive legal representation is not an
economically feasible option for many taxpayers, including not only indigent taxpayers,
but also large corporate taxpayers, except when the financial stake is significantly
high.").
104 "The IRS Mission: Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with
integrity and fairness to all." Internal Revenue Manual § 1.1.1.1, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/O,,id=98141,00.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
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restructuring Appeals so that almost every case immediately enters
mediation, these problems could be mitigated. Specifically, in mediation an
unrepresented taxpayer will not be disadvantaged by his lack of expertise
because a neutral third party is involved who will fairly assess the merits of
each side's claim. 105
The current Appeals system is equally deficient as to disputes over large
monetary sums. The problem here is that the method employed by Appeals-
negotiation-is not optimally suited for the most efficient resolution of large
tax disputes. 10 6 The opportunity for face-to-face discussions will suffice to
produce agreement in some cases, 107 but many cases are destined for
litigation because the amount in controversy is so high that zealous
representation is warranted.' 08 Where the respective proposals of the
taxpayer and the IRS are separated by hundreds of thousands of dollars, each
side is much more likely to remain steadfast, justifying mounting costs-and
the prospective costs of litigation-with the thought of how much will be
won in the end. 10 9 The current structure of Appeals relies on negotiation to
bring the taxpayer and IRS Appeals officer to an agreement. In fact, every
case that enters Appeals must go through the negotiation process."l 0 The
potential of the current system is ultimately limited in cases where parties are
unwilling or unable to gain a realistic view of the merits of their claims.
Negotiation facilitates stalemate in these situations. This means that certain
105 See infra Part IV.
106 See Friedman, supra note 33, at 767 (noting that negotiation often fails to settle
many tax disputes because the parties "are unable to place in proper perspective the
potential weaknesses of their own position or the strengths of the other party's."); Rock,
supra note 61, at 69 ("After lengthy and arduous negotiations... [n]either side would
move beyond its position, and litigation seems inevitable.").
107 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 215.
108 See supra note 97 (discussing the economic decisionmaking behind shareholder
class action lawsuits). The economic decisionmaking involved in shareholder class action
lawsuits, i.e., the aggregation of claims, also supports the proposition that claims
involving a large sum of money warrant vigorous pursuit. See Coffee, supra note 97, at
678; see also Knight, supra note 102, at 68 (noting that a colorable claim may not be
pursued because of overwhelming costs); Korteling, supra note 6, at 663 (explaining that
the high costs of defending a claim are not justified, "except when the financial stake is
significantly high") (emphasis added); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995) (discussing the economic reasons
why a party may prefer litigation over ADR).
109 But see Rock, supra note 61, at 69 (explaining how the use of mediation effected
the resolution of a dispute where the positions of the IRS and taxpayer had been
separated by hundreds of thousands of dollars).
110 See Wei supra note 6, at 552 (explaining that mediation and arbitration are
available only when negotiations have failed).
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cases will never be resolved through the negation process. Mediation can
help remedy this problem. Mediation is successful largely because it allows a
neutral third party to take a fresh look at the case, evaluating the merits of
each side's claim.111
By requiring each case to go through the negotiation process, Appeals
may cause one of two problematic results for large taxpayers. First, after
spending over a year 112 in the Appeals system, a taxpayer may become
dissatisfied with the progress of the available administrative remedies and
decide to forgo mediation. Alternatively, a taxpayer may spend a significant
amount of time in negotiation, only to eventually settle through mediation. 113
In either scenario, time and money are wasted. Mediation is more optimally
suited for the resolution of large tax disputes, and by directing most cases to
mediation immediately (and not requiring traditional negotiation to run its
course), both taxpayers and the IRS would stand to save resources.
Ultimately, the impressive settlement rate demonstrated by Appeals must
be questioned in two respects. First, of those cases that are settled, are the
outcomes fair from the perspective of most taxpayers? In light of the
probable lack of representation of many taxpayers and of a general fear of the
cost and uncertainty of litigation, that question should probably be answered
in the negative. And second, could an even more impressive settlement rate
result from a process that forces the parties to reevaluate their proposals? A
consideration of basic economics in decisionmaking demonstrates that this
question should be answered in the affirmative. Therefore, a reconsideration
of the effectiveness of Appeals-and a move toward a mediation-based
system-may help lead to an increase in both the quality and quantity of tax
dispute settlements within the IRS.
III See Katz-Pearlman & Adelson, supra note 52, at 2626; see also WARE supra
note 13, at § 4.13 (discussing the role a mediator plays in ascertaining a region of
mutually acceptable settlement). Additionally, while a case may remain in Appeals for
more than a year, mediation "causes the parties to look ahead to and focus on the actual
mediation session, and, in turn, the actual mediation session forces the parties to
concentrate exclusively, in a compressed time frame and in a settlement-oriented
environment, on resolving the dispute." Jones, supra note 47.
112 See Jones, supra note 47 (noting that "[i]t is not unusual for a large case to
languish at appeals for more than a year or two").
113 See Rock, supra note 61, at 69. After spending months in the negotiation phase
of Appeals, "the parties were at an impasse." Id. The parties submitted the case to
mediation and a settlement was quickly brought about. Id.
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B. Mediation-Realizing a Problem-Solving Mentality
The Service's use of mediation is a promising development that should
result in an increase in the number of cases resolved before litigation, and an
improvement in the fairness of final settlement agreements. 114 The promotion
of mediation is a means by which the IRS can work toward greater efficiency
and fairness, and it may be a significant tool that could persuade the
taxpaying public to rethink its preconceptions about what the IRS is all
about. 115 Mediation is optimally suited for the resolution of many tax
disputes, particularly those involving very large and very small claims.
Specifically, through mediation, small claims may find more equitable
settlement, and large claims may be settled more frequently, because
mediation forces parties to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of their
case. 116 The words of a high-ranking IRS director convey the potential
mediation possesses toward those ends:
[M]ediation gives you a chance to take another shot, a chance possibly to
recruit an ally who may agree with your position and tell the Appeals
Officer, "I think the taxpayer has a good argument." At the same time if
there is a hole in your argument, you may find out in advance of litigation,
and it gives you a chance to step back and settle. 117
114 See Wei, supra note 6, at 559 (noting that "mediation is a handy tool in resolving
taxpayer disputes of almost any color").
115 See id. at 549 ("The IRS hopes that the use of mediation will improve the
taxpayer's view of the tax collection system, thereby making taxpayers more willing to
participate in paying taxes.").
The IRS has traditionally been viewed disapprovingly by the general taxpaying
public. See William G. Andreozzi, Comment, Prohibiting the Deduction for Non-
Corporate Tax Deficiency Interest: When Treasury Goes Too Far, 34 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 557, 559 (2001) (describing "the American public's perception of the IRS as an
agency that abuses its power."). A 1999 Gallup poll found that 70% of Americans think
the IRS has too much power, and 69% think that its power is misused. Id. at 559 n.10; see
also The Gallup Organization, Public By 3 to 1 Margin Believes IRS Abuses Its Powers,
at http://www.gallup.conpoll/releases/pr971003.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
The development of mediation mechanisms by the IRS demonstrates the agency's
awareness of its public image and its desire to reshape public perceptions. See Resolving
Actual and Potential Disputes, supra note 42, at 263 (emphasizing an "overall strategy
[that is] ... less contentious, and less burdensome .... ). In fact, an IRS official strongly
supports mediation at least in part because it may demonstrate a transformation from an
agency in "the issue-raising business" to one in "the issue resolution business." Id.
116 See Jones, supra note 47.
117 Resolution of Federal Income Tax Controversies, supra note 5, at 276.
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Along with the intrinsic benefits of its methodology (i.e., informality,
flexibility, and forcing parties to reexamine the strength of their claims),
mediation offers tremendous economic benefits. 118 That is, the parties
involved-both the taxpayer and the IRS-stand to save time and money
when mediation is successful and litigation is avoided.' 19
Confidentiality and impartiality are two characteristics that are essential
to successful mediation. 120 The confidentiality of mediation communications
may vary according to whether the mediation is in Appeals or in a federal
court. In Appeals, the mediation process is confidential. 121 Accordingly, the
communication that takes place in the mediation session should not be
subject to discovery in later judicial proceedings. The confidentiality of
mediation proceedings in federal court, however, is less certain. Although
particular rules of evidence may protect mediation communications, 122 there
is no federal evidentiary rule that explicitly protects confidential mediation
communications. A rule of evidence explicitly protecting mediation
communications from discovery and admissibility in a subsequent judicial
proceeding should be promulgated, so as to encourage open communication
in the mediation process.
The Service's mediation programs, however promising, contain room for
improvement regarding mediator impartiality. Deficiencies in this area could
118 See Rock, supra note 61, at 72.
119 Id. ("mediation offers substantial advantages-and few disadvantages-in cases
where differences between the taxpayer and Appeals are unresolved."); see also Carlton
M. Smith, Innovative Settlement Techniques Can Reduce Litigation Costs, 78 J. TAX'N
76, 79-80 (1993).
The benefits of mediation could also be more fully realized with the promulgation of
formal Tax Court rules, similar to those set forth in Rule 124 regarding arbitration. See
Collins, supra note 48. Currently, Rule 124 merely mentions that mediation is available
for use in Tax Court and is used at that level at the discretion of the judge. Id. If
mediation were significantly addressed in Tax Court procedural rules, its availability
would become more widely known and its use might be encouraged to a greater extent.
Id.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 53 & 54.
121 See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. § 5.10. "[A]ll information concerning
any dispute resolution communication is confidential and may not be disclosed by any
party, participant, observer or mediator except as provided by statute, such as in § 6103
of the Internal Revenue Code and 5 U.S.C. § 574." Id.
122 See Mostovoi, supra note 53, at 1876 n.42. Federal Rule of Evidence 408
prohibits disclosures of offers in compromise. Fed. R. Evid. 408. Rule 501 deals with
evidentiary privileges. Fed. R. Evid. 501. That rule states that the law of evidentiary
privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law." For an examination
of the applicability of evidentiary privilege to mediators, see In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d
627, 639 (4th Cir. 2002); NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v.
Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994). See Mostovoi, supra note 53, at 1876 n.42.
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potentially lead to serious inequities for taxpayers and compromise the
ultimate effectiveness of mediation. One of the key characteristics of
successful mediation is the impartiality and independence of the mediator. 
123
In its pilot programs, the IRS had given taxpayers a choice in selecting a
mediator. 124 The taxpayer could select an independent mediator or elect to
use an Appeals officer who was trained as a mediator. 125 The IRS clearly
favored the use of its own personnel, and reserved the right to not mediate if
the taxpayer chose a non-IRS employee. 126 Proponents of the use of an in-
house mediator argue that using a mediator familiar with tax issues is vital to
the efficiency of the system.127 Based on the success of similar programs in
other government agencies, it is believed that bias in favor of the IRS
position is not a significant problem. 128 In fact, the IRS is so confident that
an in-house mediator will not compromise the program, that its newest
initiative eliminates the taxpayer's choice altogether. 129 Under the new plan,
the mediator will be an employee of the IRS. 130 The mediator may even be a
member of the same office in which the taxpayer's case is assigned. 
131
123 See WARE, supra note 13, § 4.15; see also supra text accompanying notes 53 &
54. Mediator selection is critical to the success of the mediation process and must be
"scrutinized carefully" because the mediator will influence the entire process. See Wei,
supra note 6, at 558.
124 See Wei, supra note 6, at 558.
125 See Jones, supra note 47. If the taxpayer selected an independent mediator, the
mediator's fees were split between the IRS and the taxpayer. However, if the taxpayer
chose an Appeals officer as mediator, the taxpayer was not liable for any of the cost of
employing the mediator's services. Id.
126 See id. (noting that almost all mediation sessions involved an Appeals mediator
and that use of an Appeals mediator was implicitly required).
127 See Wei, supra note 6, at 567 (noting that "[tihe use of non-IRS mediators may
slow down the mediation process because the mediators are not familiar with tax issues
and the tax law").
128 See id. Special mediator training is believed to compensate for possible problems
in impartiality. See id. at 563 n.90, 567 n. 119.
129 See Jones, supra note 47; see also Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10 § 5.
130 Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10 § 5.07. Every mediation session in
Appeals must involve an Appeals mediator, but the taxpayer may be able to bring in a
non-IRS co-mediator. Id. § 5.08. The basic qualifications of a non-IRS co-mediator
include: "completion of mediation training, previous mediation experience, a substantive
knowledge of tax law, or knowledge of industry practices." Id.
131 Id. ('The taxpayer and the Appeals Team Manager will select an Appeals
mediator from a list of eligible individuals who, generally will be from the same Appeals
office or geographic area, but not the same group, where the case is assigned.")
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There are apparent advantages to using in-house personnel for
mediation. 132 For example, an Appeals mediator presumably possesses
expertise regarding tax issues and will be able to fully understand a
taxpayer's claim. 133 This may not be the case with a truly independent
mediator who may lack tax expertise. Second, an Appeals mediator will be
able to offer considerably more practical experience in tax dispute
settlements than most private mediators. 134 Finally, being a part of the IRS,
an Appeals mediator is likely to possess an "institutional incentive" to have
the case result in settlement. 135 However, even if Appeals mediators can in
fact be neutral, and even if they possess advantages over non-expertised
mediators, the perception of a lack of impartiality among taxpayers may limit
the number of taxpayers who are willing to pursue mediation, thereby
limiting the overall effectiveness of the program. 136 Therefore, the IRS
should modify its mediator selection procedures to at least give taxpayers the
option of having a non-IRS mediator.
C. Arbitration-Still A Good Alternative to Litigation
Like the other forms of ADR utilized in resolving tax disputes,
arbitration offers significant advantages over litigation. First, arbitration
creates a much more favorable atmosphere for taxpayers, especially those
132 See Jones, supra note 47 (noting that an "appeals mediator comes to the table
with at least several distinct advantages over a private sector mediator"); Wei, supra note
6, at 567 ("The use of non-IRS mediators may slow down the mediation process because
the mediators are not familiar with tax issues and the tax law").
133 See Jones, supra note 47. Furthermore, "the appeals mediator knows what
motivates another appeals officer, how she or he thinks, how that person's supervisor
factors into the settlement process, and how the unwritten rules at appeals influence the
process." Id.
134 Id. (noting that "[a] taxpayer would be hard-pressed to find a private-sector
mediator who has handled as many federal tax settlements as an experienced appeals
mediator").
135 Id. The fact that an Appeals mediator is "charged by appeals with mediating and
settling cases" shows that the IRS, at least in some respects, associates the occupational
success of its Appeals officers with their ability to settle cases. Id. Support of this concept
is seen in remarks by Large and Mid-Size Business Division director Larry Langdon, "we
want to institutionalize the concept that we're in the issue resolution business rather than
the issue-raising business. It's important both internally and externally that we change
our cultures to reflect that." Resolving Actual and Potential Disputes, supra note 42, at
263; see also Marcus & Senger, supra note 37, at 722 (discussing the importance of
institutionalizing dispute resolution mentalities in other government agencies).
136 But see Jones, supra note 47 (arguing that having an Appeals mediator from a
different part of the country would suffice to assure taxpayers of impartiality).
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with small claims, that do not have legal representation. 137 Tax Court
presents two significant factors that disadvantage non-expertised taxpayers.
The most obvious is that the taxpayer presents his case against a trained
lawyer that is knowledgeable of tax law. 138 The taxpayer is further
handicapped by the court's strict rules of evidence. 139 The use of arbitration
can mitigate these inequities. 140 The taxpayer's lack of legal knowledge is
aided by the fact that an increased level of informal interaction is permitted
with the arbitration panel as compared to what the degree of interaction the
taxpayer would experience with a Tax Court judge. 141 Additionally,
arbitration is characterized by less formal rules of evidence, allowing the
taxpayer to make a more effective statement of his case. 142 So, especially for
those taxpayers who have chosen not to have-or who simply cannot
afford-legal representation, arbitration offers meaningful advantages over
litigation. Arbitration can also lessen the caseload of the Tax Courts. 143
Cases laden with factual issues eat up valuable court time, and arbitration can
be used to resolve many of those disputes without litigation. 144
Arbitration, however, offers few advantages over mediation. The
advantages arbitration presents to pro se taxpayers are only amplified in
mediation. 145 Compared to arbitration, mediation presents even fewer
137 See Korteling, supra note 6, at 681.
13 8 Id.
139 Id.
140 Arbitration mitigates the burdens associated with the adversarial process. Id. In
tax litigation, pro se taxpayers are typically disadvantaged by their lack of knowledge of
often complex tax law. Id. That lack of knowledge inevitably affects the taxpayer's
ability to fully argue the merits of his claim. Arbitration eases this burden because it
"allow[s] dialogue between the taxpayer and the arbitration panel that is more open than
that between the taxpayer and a judge." Id.
Arbitration is particularly beneficial for pro se taxpayers because the applicable rules
of evidence are much less stringent than those in litigation. Id. Therefore, "[a]lthough a
taxpayer proceeding pro se might not be able to present his case as effectively as
experienced counsel might, taxpayers who normally would not obtain counsel benefit by
presenting evidence more effectively." Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 682.
144 Id. at 682-83.
145 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 218. The primary reason a taxpayer would not seek
representation is cost. Indeed, the primary reason why mediation is a favored form of




obstacles for an untrained, non-expertised taxpayer. 146 For this reason, the
IRS should focus more on the development of its mediation programs than
arbitration. Additionally, the Tax Court should consider making mediation
more of a priority for docketed cases.
IV. BRINGING ABOUT EVEN GREATER EFFICIENCY IN TAX DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
The IRS Appeals Office truly does operate as an alternative dispute
resolution forum. 147 That is, through the Appeals process, eighty-five to
ninety percent of all tax disputes are resolved outside of a courtroom. 148
However, the current Appeals system is not optimally suited to the most
efficient and fair resolution of tax disputes. 149 Taxpayer-Appeals officer
negotiations may lead to inequitable settlements in small tax disputes, and
many large tax disputes may go unresolved after the Appeals process has run
its course. In light of the fact that the current Appeals structure displays areas
that warrant improvement, the IRS should pursue a major restructuring of its
dispute resolution process. That restructuring should entail a commitment to
mediation, rather than negotiation. 150
The IRS should restructure its Appeals Office so that mediation is the
default method of dispute resolution. Mediation should not just be pursued in
the event that negotiation fails to bring about settlement; 51 instead,
146 See Collins, supra note 48. Mediation is particularly well-suited for
unrepresented taxpayers because it "provid[es] an informal environment for the parties to
discuss the specifics of their case with candor, as well as provid[es] interpretation of the
law applicable to the dispute." Id.
147 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 215 (describing how the Appeals process operates
essentially as negotiation between taxpayers and IRS Appeals officers).
148 See supra note 5.
149 See supra Part 1-1.A; see also WARE, supra note 13, § 4.30.
150 Additionally, given the fact that mediation is particularly well-suited for the
resolution of tax disputes, the Tax Court should promulgate rules regarding mediation at
that level. The benefits of ADR could also be more fully realized with the development of
additional rules regarding mediation in Tax Court. While an additional round of
mediation in Tax Court will likely be unproductive where a case has already gone
through the process in Appeals, mediation should be encouraged in Tax Court when the
taxpayer chooses to forgo the Appeals process. Promulgation of formal procedural rules
for mediation in Tax Court would make mediation a more viable option at that stage.
151 See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 10 § 4.01 (mediation "may be used only
after Appeals settlement discussions are unsuccessful"); see also Scherer, supra note 2, at
217. Because most cases are settled in Appeals, the IRS has designed other ADR
procedures "so as to insure that the new procedures do not undermine the Appeals
process." Id.
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taxpayers and the Appeals officers should sit down with a third party neutral
from the outset so that a greater number of and higher quality resolutions can
be effected. The IRS does make mediation available before a case even
reaches Appeals through its fast track mediation program, but that alternative
is inadequate because of the restraints placed on IRS agents at that level. 152
The current Appeals system presents two major problems. First, small
taxpayer claimants are susceptible to unfair treatment. 153 Second, large
claims are less likely to be resolved through simple taxpayer-Appeals officer
negotiations. 154 The introduction of a third party neutral into the process
ameliorates these problems. 155 Specifically, a neutral third party will likely
act as a prophylactic against the potential inequitable results that may arise
when expertised and non-expertised persons face off. Moreover, a neutral
third party will act as a sounding board that can prompt parties to reexamine
the strengths and weaknesses of their claims. 156
Other interests may also be furthered with a full-scale implementation of
mediation. The IRS and taxpayers could both benefit from a more
widespread use of mediation. 157 The most obvious benefit to both parties is
time and cost savings. 158 A secondary benefit for the IRS would be that as
nearly every dispute goes through the mediation process, the institutional
mentality within the Service-and perhaps even the external perception of
the IRS by the taxpaying public-will develop an expectation that nearly all
disputes can be fairly resolved without litigation. 159 A resolution-focused
152 See James A. Dougherty & Tracey A. Fielman, Large and Mid-Size Division
Fast Track Dispute Resolution Pilot Program, The Tax Executive, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 41,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/fasttrack.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003)
(because IRS agents cannot consider the hazards of litigation in determining acceptable
settlement figures, no substantive negotiations can take place); see also B. John Williams,
Jr., IRS Chief Counsel Offers Tax Shelter Resolution Strategies, Tax Notes Today (Feb.
28, 2003) available at LEXIS 2003 TNT 40-20 ("The hazards of litigation are the
primary factor in determining the terms of any settlement initiative."); Pamela J.
Gardiner, Taxpayers Should Be Informed of the Benefits of the Fast Track Mediation
Program, Report of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (March
2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/2002reports/200210070fr.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2003).
153 See supra Part III.A.
154 See supra Part III.A.
155 See supra Part II.B.
156 See Rock, supra note 61, at 72.
157 See Wei, supra note 6, at 569. "Mediation can result in significant cost and time
savings to the IRS. Such benefits would please the taxpayers and IRS alike." Id.
158 See Rock, supra note 61, at 72.
159 See Resolving Actual and Potential Disputes, supra note 42, at 263; see also
supra text accompanying note 152.
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atmosphere will, in turn, perpetuate cost savings for both parties as more
cases find resolution more quickly. As mediation is used more in the ordinary
course of events within the IRS, the quantity and quality of successfully
mediated settlements are likely to increase. The IRS and taxpayers will avoid
the cost of litigation, and taxpayers will be more likely to benefit from the
product of the mediation process.
The implementation of a mediation-focused Appeals Office would
require two initial determinations. First, Appeals would need to determine
which cases would qualify. Second, Appeals would need to determine for
which cases, if any, mediation would be mandatory. The first issue may
easily be answered: all cases within the jurisdiction of Appeals qualify. Any
tax dispute that has reached Appeals can be submitted to mediation;
negotiation sessions do not have to prove ineffective before mediation is
available. This then leads to the second determination. Initially, it is
important to point out that not every tax dispute finds its way to Appeals. A
taxpayer has the right to forego the Appeals system altogether and
immediately sue the IRS. 160 But of those cases that are pursued within
Appeals, most should be handled through mediation. As a practical matter, in
some cases, the respective positions of the taxpayer and the Service are close
enough so that the dispute can be resolved with minimal time and effort by
either party. 161 With that in mind, cases should not be immediately directed
to mediation. Instead, only if the dispute is not resolved through an initial
phone conversation or meeting, should mediation be mandatory. Mediation,
then, should be the second step in the Appeals process.
Additionally, important changes should be made in the Service's
mediation procedure. Using Appeals officers as mediators presents serious
inequities for taxpayers and may contribute to a perception among taxpayers
that they cannot get a fair deal. 162 In order to eliminate a lack of real or
potential impartiality, taxpayers should have three options regarding
mediator selection. The first two options involve just one mediator, while the
third would involve two persons acting as co-mediators. First, a taxpayer
should have the right to request that a non-IRS mediator be the sole mediator.
Second, a taxpayer could agree to use an IRS employee mediator. This
option should be paralleled by the creation of a mediator division within the
IRS so that Appeals officers do not perform the role of IRS advocate one day
and act as neutral mediators another. This mediator division would be wholly
separate from Appeals, and its mediators would perform just one function-
160 If a taxpayer foregoes his Appeals rights and immediately sues the IRS,
mediation may still be available. See supra note 150.
161 See PUBLICATION 5, supra note 1.
162 See supra Part Il.B.
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that of mediator. A third option for taxpayers would be to use both an IRS
and non-IRS mediator. 163
With a transformation of Appeals from a system that relies
predominately on taxpayer-Appeals officer negotiations to one that focuses
on mediation, all parties involved in tax disputes will benefit. Mediation will
ensure that small claims are settled fairly for taxpayers and will lead to a
greater number of settlements in large disputes. Additionally, the IRS will
benefit from an increase in time and cost savings. The development of ADR
demonstrates recent efforts to improve the service, efficiency, and perception
of the IRS. Unfortunately, decades of apparent success with the Appeals
Office has lulled the IRS into believing that new forms of ADR should only
supplement the traditional use of negotiation techniques. However, to
achieve optimum service, efficiency, and goodwill, the IRS should pursue
mediation more fully.
V. CONCLUSION
The IRS, despite its notorious reputation, has been in the alternative
dispute resolution business for over seventy-five years. 164 Perhaps only
recently, however, has the Service made customer service a priority. In
pursuit of this goal, and in an effort to comply with congressional mandate,
ADR mechanisms have been developed to supplement the success of the
Appeals Division. 165 In addition, arbitration and mediation remain viable
options even after a case leaves Appeals without a settlement. 166
Assessment of the success and future of the new ADR initiatives depends
on how well they address the deficiencies that have existed in the Appeals
Office. Careful analysis demonstrates that mediation has the potential to
considerably mitigate unfairness that exists in the Appeals process for small
taxpayer claimants. The nature of the mediation process allows taxpayers to
fairly engage with the IRS even when they do not employ legal
representation. 167 Moreover, mediation will force the IRS and taxpayers to
carefully scrutinize the merits of their claims, leading to the settlement of an
even greater number of large tax disputes. A system that appears fair will
promote even greater confidence in resolution outside of court and ultimately
163 See Rev. Proc. 2002-44, 2002-26 I.R.B. 12 § 5.06 (the IRS currently permits
taxpayers to elect to use a non-IRS co-mediator, at the taxpayer's expense).
164 See Louthan & Wrappe, supra note 9, at 1473.
165 See Scherer, supra note 2, at 215.
166 See T.C.R. 124.
167 See supra Part II.B.
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provide tremendous incentive for taxpayers to avoid the expense of litigation
altogether.
While significant changes can still be made, particularly with the use of
truly impartial mediators, the promise that mediation provides should
persuade the IRS to undergo a major restructuring of its Appeals Office,
making mediation the core of its administrative dispute resolution process.
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